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When It’s (Mostly) the Taking Part that Counts: 
The Post-Application Consequences of Employment Tribunal Claims
*
 
This paper uses the 2003 Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications to examine the post-
application employment consequences for individuals registering complaints to Employment 
Tribunals following dismissal or redundancy. In examining this issue, we consider a number 
of pieces of evidence: (i) the probability of finding another job; (ii) the time taken to get a new 
job and (iii) the pay/status of the new job. It is found that age plays a significant role in 
aspects (i) and (iii), whilst those who previously held managerial positions generally took 
longest to get a new job and found it most difficult to achieve a similar level of pay/status in 
their current jobs. Long-term health problems/disability is associated with significantly worse 
outcomes on all three measures. Respondents whose cases were dismissed by the tribunals 
without hearings fared worst in terms of obtaining a new job and the time it took to do so 
compared with other outcomes. There were, however, fewer differences by outcome in the 
relative pay/status of the claimant’s current job. 
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A relatively large literature has emerged in North America on the impact of job 
loss on the subsequent employment outcomes of displaced workers. For 
example, it is has been found that worker displacement leads to lower 
earnings in both the short run (Farber, 1997) and long run (Jacobsen et al., 
1993; Huff Stevens, 1997), higher rates of part-time employment (Farber, 
1997; McCall, 1997) and a greater likelihood of further spells of 
unemployment (Ruhm, 1991). In contrast, there is comparatively little 
evidence in this area for the UK (exceptions include Casey, 1995; Gregory 
and Jukes, 2001; and Borland et al., 2002 – see below). However in the US, 
with a few exceptions which vary by state (Ewing et al., 2005; Autor et al., 
2006), most non-unionised workers in the private sector are not covered by 
statutory unjust discharge protection, but are instead employed on at ‘at-will’ 
basis. The same is not true for unionised workers who are typically employed 
on contracts which provide for arbitration in the event of a disputed 
separation.  
 
By way of contrast, the UK has a well-established system with adjudication in 
a whole range of employment-related disputes being the role of Employment 
Tribunals (ETs). However, little is known in either setting of the consequences 
of seeking redress for unjust discharge in terms of the post-application 
employment experiences of grievants
1. This paper attempts to fill these gaps 
using UK data from the 2003 Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications 
                                                 
1 There is however some limited descriptive discussion using the same dataset as deployed 
here in Hayward et al. (2004). See also Tremlett and Banerji (1994). 
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 (SETA 2003) to examine a range of post-tribunal outcomes for workers 
displaced from their previous job by way of dismissal or redundancy. In 
particular, we seek to explore the process of job search following a claim
2 – 
the probability of finding employment, the duration (completed or ongoing) of 
unemployment and, for those individuals who succeed in finding alternative 
employment, the quality of job match in terms of both status and pay.  
 
Ascertaining the post-application impact of ET claims is an important issue. 
Whilst the short-run pecuniary costs of bringing a claim are typically modest, 
the total cost to the appellant must necessarily also include the psychic costs 
of the going through the complaints procedure itself, as well as the additional 
costs in terms of the subsequent impact on employment prospects. Labelling, 
stigmatisation and scarring are all phenomena of interest in this context. From 
a policy perspective, the work reported here has important ramifications: if the 
very act of bringing a case results in substantial costs to the appellant, this 
may have a significant impact on the propensity to bring cases, such that the 
observed number of applications (which has risen over time – see Figure 1) 
actually disguises further latent demand for this form of redress. If this is the 
situation, it provides some support for the proposal which appeared in the 
Fairness at Work White Paper that preceded the 1999 Employment Relations 
Act to abolish the ceilings for compensatory awards in unfair dismissal cases 
on the grounds that redress should take into account the full and potentially 
long-term employment consequences indicated above. In the end, and 
                                                 
2 This is perhaps more important in the British context, since re-employment remedies at 
tribunals are extremely rare (Dickens, et al. 1984; Brown et al. 1997; Knight and Latreille, 
2001). In the US arbitration context, see for example Bemmels (1988). 
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 presumably in response to employer representations, the Act merely 
implemented a substantial increase in the upper limit from around £12,000 to 
£50,000 (now £58,400), although as before, the majority of awards fall 
significantly short of this. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
In our analysis we are able to model certain aspects of the job search of 
individuals who brought ET claims against their former employer, controlling 
for a variety of applicant, employer and case characteristics. In particular we 
consider the impact of the way in which the case was resolved: settled before 
tribunal; withdrawn/dismissed before tribunal; won at tribunal; and lost at 
tribunal. A priori, we anticipate that the mode of resolution will impinge heavily 
on appellants’ post-application experiences, since this is likely to inform 
potential employers in their hiring decisions. Such information will likely be 
revealed by application forms, references from the former employer and 
employer networks (such as employers’ associations, HRM practitioner 
groups and periodicals, etc.). While we are of the view that bringing a case at 
all may potentially deter future employers due to the labelling of the applicant 
as a ‘troublemaker’
3, we predict those who lose (or possibly withdraw) a case 
are likely to find this situation exacerbated. 
                                                 
3 A limiting feature of the analysis is that the data relate only to those who brought claims; we 
are thus unable to compare the consequences for those bringing claims relative to those who 
did not. 
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 BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
The burgeoning North American literature on worker displacement suggests 
that job loss can affect the subsequent labour market prospects of an 
individual in several ways
4. In terms of employment, Farber (1997) reports 
that rates of new employment are significantly related to education, gender 
and ethnicity using US data from the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS). In 
particular, using a probit model to estimate employment at the survey date, 
there was found to be a 16 percentage point differential between the 
employment probability of college and high school graduates, which were also 
8 and 13 percentage points lower for females and ethnic minorities 
respectively. Age variations are also evident, with older displaced workers 
finding it most difficult to find new employment. For example, individuals aged 
between 55 and 64 had re-employment rates which were 19 percentage 
points lower than those aged between 20 and 24. However, job loss still 
imposes costs on younger workers since Farber (1997) reports that displaced 
workers aged between 25 and 44 had significantly higher employment rates 
compared to those in the youngest age category based on some 
specifications. In addition, Gustafson (1998) reports that young displaced 
workers experience significantly lower employment probabilities and work 
shorter hours than those who hadn’t experienced job displacement. This 
suggests that young workers are also significantly affected by job 
displacement
5.   
 
                                                 
4 See Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998) for reviews of this literature. 
5 Gregg (2001) examines the impact of youth unemployment on adult unemployment in the 
UK.  
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 Farber (1997) finds that displaced workers were also more likely to find part-
time employment since there was a 6 percentage point difference between 
the incidence of part-time work between the current and lost job for displaced 
workers. McCall (1997) reports that amongst displaced Canadian workers 
who had lost full-time jobs, females stayed unemployed longer and were more 
likely to find a part-time job when they became re-employed. Further analysis 
revealed that gender differences in worker characteristics had little 
explanatory power. Fallick (1996) examines the factors affecting the transition 
from unemployment to employment for displaced workers. He finds that the 
industry of the previous job had an impact on job search intensity and 
reservation wages. 
 
Earnings of displaced workers tend to be significantly lower in the short term. 
For example, Farber (1997) finds using the DWS that the real difference 
between pre and post-displacement weekly earnings averaged around 13% 
between 1981 and 1995. For some, however, the losses could be of very 
large orders of magnitude, since around a third of workers reported a loss of 
at least 25%. In contrast, 30-40% reported that earnings in their new job 
represented an increase compared to their previous jobs (Kletzer, 1998). The 
regression analysis undertaken by Farber (1997) reveals that by far the 
largest earnings penalties exist for older workers but that they decline with 
levels of education, with the losses of high school graduates around 7% 
greater than comparable college graduates. Relatively small differences were 
reported by gender and ethnicity. 
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 Moreover, evidence from the US indicates that the effect of job displacement 
on earnings is permanent. In particular, Jacobsen et al. (1993) using 
administrative data consisting of high tenure workers find that long term 
earnings losses average around 25% per year. Whilst Huff Stevens (1997), 
using representative data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, reports 
that the earnings of displaced workers are 9% lower than expected levels six 
or more years after the separation. The reasons that have been suggested to 
explain these reductions in earnings include the loss of firm specific and 
general human capital, the loss of a potentially good job match and the loss of 
wage premia. Earnings penalties in the longer term have been found to 
increase with age, tenure in the previous job and the loss of a union job.   
   
According to Borland et al. (2002), the first UK evidence on unemployment on 
subsequent earnings comes from Gregory and Jukes (2001)
6. They match a 
sample of male unemployment benefit claimants (from the JUVOS database) 
to wage data from the New Earnings Survey. They report an initial average 
earnings penalty of over 10% from losing a job compared to those who 
remained in their job but that these losses decline over time, falling to around 
4% after 2 years and to around 2% after this. Earnings penalties are found to 
vary with age and occupation, with older and those from more skilled 
occupations most affected. Arulampalam (2001) utilizes the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and finds that the long run earnings losses for an 
                                                 
6 An early version of this paper was published in 1997 as a Department for Employment 
Discussion Paper.  
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 unemployed worker are over 10%
7. She also notes that displaced workers as 
a result of redundancies are less scarred than those losing their jobs for other 
reasons, such as dismissals or sackings. This may be because workers are 
given notice of redundancy or that they may find better job matches because 
of the redundancy payments that they receive. Alternatively, redundancies, by 
virtue of their typically collective nature, may also be less stigmatising: 
dismissal is a strong signal typically applied to individuals; collective dismissal 
in contrast, is not attributed to an individual, but rather to ‘bad luck’, so the 
effect is weaker 
 
Possibly of most relevance to our study is the paper by Borland et al. (2002). 
They use data from the BHPS from 1991 to 1996 to examine the impact of job 
displacement on a range of labour market outcomes and not only focus on the 
unemployed but also on those who become economically inactive following a 
job loss. It is found that the raw earnings loss for displaced workers in their 
new job compared to their lost job was around 10%, although this was only 
around 4% if the displaced worker found another full-time job. This 
underestimates the actual loss because of the earnings growth of those who 
remain in employment, which was around 5% per annum for their sample. 
Regression analysis indicates that earnings losses are greater for those who 
were out of work longer and those aged over 50. When weekly wages are 
considered, wage growth was significantly lower for those with longer tenures 
in their previous jobs and for females. 
                                                 
7 Arulampalam et al. (2001) suggest reasons for differences in the results of Arulampalam 
(2001) and Gregory and Jukes (2001) including differences in sample sizes, in the definition 
of unemployment and in the durations of unemployment spells between the two datasets.  
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 Borland et al. (2002) also analyse the factors that impinge on the time it takes 
to get a new job by computing Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the time 
taken to return to work (in months) using a Cox likelihood model. For 
displaced workers only, they report that those aged over 50 take significantly 
longer to find a new job, whilst individuals with children and those who had 
been with their employers for less than a year and who were employed in 
private services found jobs significantly faster. This was also true for those 
with non-manual occupations, compared to managers. Gender, marital status 
and qualifications did not have a significant effect.  
 
It should also be noted that there also exists evidence on the subsequent 
labour market experiences of UK workers who had been made redundant. For 
example, Casey (1995) uses data from the Labour Force Survey to examine 
which characteristics affect the chances of finding a new job. After estimating 
a logit model, re-employment probabilities were reported to be lower for ethnic 
minorities and older workers but higher for females and married people. Some 
characteristics of the individual’s previous job were also found to be important. 
In terms of occupation, semi skilled manuals workers were least likely to have 
returned to work and those who had professional/managerial and junior 
managerial/technical jobs the most likely. Re-employment rates were higher 
for workers who had lost jobs in small establishments and in agriculture, 
business and financial services.  Casey (1995) also reports that having a 
health problem lowered the chances of older people returning to work.  
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 In this paper we are only able to examine the short term impacts of job loss 
since we only have information from the time the interview took place. 
However, we do have the additional stigma effect of going to a tribunal, in 
addition to the possible negative effects of job loss itself, while the the 
difference between dismissal and redundancy can also be explored. Before 
discussing the data, we next proceed to outline how ETs operate in the UK 
and also provide a brief review of the main empirical findings on ETs in the 
UK. 
 
In total, around 100,000 cases are now brought to ETs each year, this number 
varying over time (Figure 1) in response to both secular factors such as the 
range of grounds for complaint (jurisdictions), changes in eligibility criteria, 
etc., and cyclical factors. The single most important jurisdiction is that of unfair 
dismissal, which currently accounts for around 40% of claims. Unfair dismissal 
protection has been enshrined in British employment law since the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971
8, which introduced “the right not to be dismissed without 
good reason... an employee has a stake in his [or her] job which cannot be 
extinguished simply by serving contractual notice” (Harrison, 1990: 187, term 
in [] added). Since the legislation took force in 1972, approaching a million 
such cases have been disposed of. Redundancy payment protection has an 
even longer pedigree, having first been introduced in the Redundancy 
Payments Act 1965, since repealed and consolidated in subsequent 
legislation. 
                                                 
8 Now superseded by subsequent legislation, most notably and inter alia the Employment 
Relations Act 1999 and the Employment Act 2002 and subsequent Dispute Resolution 
Regulations (themselves currently subject to consideration by the Gibbons Review).  
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 The relative impact of cyclical and secular influences on the number of (unfair 
dismissal) applications (demand) is considered by Brown et al. (1997) (see 
also Burgess et al., 2001), whilst resolution in advance of a full merits tribunal 
hearing is the subject of Knight and Latreille (2000) (see also Saridakis et al., 
2008). Previous econometric work has also considered the determinants of 
success at tribunal hearings, focusing on grievants’ gender (Knight and 
Latreille, 2001), employer size (Saridakis et al., 2008) and voice regimes 
(Urwin et al., 2007). There is also more descriptive evidence on the impact of 
representation on outcomes (Latreille et al., 2004, 2005; Fox and Dix, 2002; 
Hayward et al., 2004a), the views of representatives concerning the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) (Latreille et al., 2004, 2007), and 
the differing perceptions of applicants and employers concerning both factual 
and affective features of cases (Dennison and Corby, 2005; Latreille, 2007a). 
However, as noted previously, almost nothing is known about the implications 
of bringing a case in terms of an appellant’s post-application employment 
experiences, and it is this deficiency that the present paper seeks to rectify. 
 
In order to better understand these experiences, it is perhaps useful to set out 
briefly the institutional framework pertaining at the time to which our data 
relate (see below)
9. The process is initiated by an individual or their 
representative completing an application form setting out the grounds for 
complaint. At the time of the survey this was known as an IT1, but has since 
been replaced by a prescribed 11-page form known as an ET1, the change 
                                                 
9 Some of the more important changes since the time of the survey are noted in Latreille et al. 
(2007). 
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 reflecting the renaming of Industrial Tribunals as Employment Tribunals from 
October 2004 (we use the current terminology throughout). This is submitted 
to the Employment Tribunals Service (ETS – now the Tribunals Service 
(Employment)) who are responsible for the administration of the case, 
including determining the jurisdiction(s) under which the case will be heard 
(and also the principal or main jurisdiction in the event there is more than 
one). The ETS send a copy of the application to the employer (respondent), 
who must reply on form IT3 (now ET3). Both originating and response forms 
are sent to Acas, who will attempt to promote conciliation between the parties, 
thereby avoiding the need for a full merits hearing, something that may in a 
small proportion of cases also be encouraged by a Pre-Hearing Review where 
parties with cases deemed to be weak may be warned that costs could be 
awarded against them in the event of an adverse judgement. 
 
ET cases can result in several possible outcomes. The majority of cases – 
around 60% in SETA 2003 – are either Acas-conciliated (COT3) or private 
settlements between the parties, in approximately the ratio 3:1 (Hayward et al. 
2004a, Table 8.6; see Latreille, 2007b for a discussion of offers and 
acceptances). Since settlements generally involve the applicant waiving the 
right to further prosecute their claim in return for some form of compensation, 
the latter are only legally binding where a ‘compromise agreement’ is signed 
following advice from an independent ‘qualified’ person such as a lawyer. 
Such cases should be distinguished from those where the claim is withdrawn 
without any redress or compensation for the applicant – 16% of cases in 
SETA 2003. A further 6% of cases were dismissed or disposed of without a 
11 
 full hearing on technical/procedural grounds
10. The remaining cases are 
determined at a full merits tribunal hearing, which will normally involve a 
three-person panel – a legally qualified chair sitting with two lay members, 
one each from panels of employee and employer practitioners. The panel may 
either uphold or reject the claim(s) made by the appellant, and in the former 
scenario will determine an award to be made by way of redress, the nature 
(and magnitude of any financial component) of which will depend on the 
jurisdiction and on the particular circumstances of the case. Costs may also 
be awarded against the losing party where is considered the party or their 
representative behaved unreasonably (including applications/defences 
without a realistic prospect of success). 
 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
SETA 2003 is the fourth in a series of periodic surveys
11 looking at the 
experiences of applicants and employers in ET cases. The latest survey was 
sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the ETS and Acas, 
with funding for a Scottish ‘boost’ provided by the Scottish Executive so as to 
facilitate a sample size large enough for separate analysis there
12. Unlike its 
predecessors the 2003 survey was designed to cover the full range of 
jurisdictions rather than focusing on a more tightly prescribed number of claim 
types. The design, sampling and data collection processes involved in the 
                                                 
10 The most recent reforms provide for pre-screening of cases, with some being applications 
(and defences) being rejected on the grounds that the relevant forms were not completed 
correctly. 
11 The earlier surveys took place in 1987, 1992 and 1998 - see Stevens (1988); Banerji et al. 
(1990); Tremlett and Banerji (1994); and DTI (2002) and Latreille and Latreille (2004) for 
information concerning the 1998 spin-out survey of representatives in ET cases. 
12 A weighting scheme is available to correct for the over-sampling of cases in Scotland. 
12 
 2003 survey are described in some detail in the SETA 2003 Technical Report 
(Hayward  et al., 2004b) available from the UK Data Archive. In essence 
however, SETA 2003 is based on a simple random sample of 4,517 cases 
completed between March 2002 and March 2003, comprising data from 
unmatched samples of applicants and employers (of size 2236 and 2281 
respectively). Interviewing was undertaken by telephone by BMRB Social 
Research from October 2003 and January 2004 using Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CATI), and was restricted to cases that were wholly 
completed at the time of the survey. Our sample is further restricted to 
applicants who separated for reasons of dismissal or redundancy from the 
former employer against whom they brought a claim
13, and also excludes 
those still working for the same at the time of application.  
 
Table 1 reports the distribution of economic activity for our sample of tribunal 
applicants by case outcome. Around 55% of applicants held full-time positions 
at the time of the interview, the percentage with such jobs varying according 
to the outcome of the case. Those who withdrew their own cases were most 
likely to be full-time employees, in part perhaps because the withdrawal of the 
application was occasioned by the fact they had managed to find a new job, 
whilst those whose case had been dismissed were the least likely to be so 
employed. In contrast, part-time employment was more common amongst this 
latter category, with 15% of claimants in this group working fewer than 30 
                                                 
13 This should mean that our sample consists solely of displaced workers rather than quits, 
but some of our sample may have quit their jobs if they believed that the employer breached 
the terms of their contract (i.e. constructive dismissal cases). The majority (more than two 
thirds) of claims in the sample involve a claim directly in relation to unfair dismissal or 
redundancy. 
13 
 hours a week in their current jobs, compared to 12% or less amongst the 
other groups. Self-employment was highest amongst those who had settled 
after their case had been withdrawn, and for applicants who had lost their 
tribunal cases. In both instances, the self-employed accounted for more than 
17% of those in employment; higher than the national self-employment rate at 
the time (Weir, 2003). For the other categories, self-employment rates were 
around the national average of 13%. This interesting consequence of post-
tribunal claims may reflect a disillusion with paid-employment for unsuccessful 
claimants and the use of compensation as start-up capital for applicants 
receiving awards or settlements (Drinkwater and Latreille, 2008). 
Unsurprisingly given the dominance of full-time paid employees, employment 
rates as a whole are highest for those who had withdrawn their cases (81%) 
and 8 percentage points lower than the average for those whose cases were 
dismissed. Around three-quarters of claimants from the remaining outcome 
groups had jobs at the time of the interview. Whereas the above data relate to 
the individual’s status at the time of the survey, as can be seen, a higher 
percentage (around 85 per cent) had been employed at some point following 
the loss of their previous job, ranging from 79 per cent of applicants who lost 
their case at a hearing, to 87 per cent of those who had been successful. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The majority of currently out of work claimants whose cases had been 
dismissed were unemployed, with 19% of individuals (two thirds of those not 
14 
 employed) in this group describing themselves as unemployed
14. Much lower 
unemployment rates are observed for other categories. The second highest 
unemployment rate belonged to claimants who had lost their cases at a 
hearing, whilst for two of the other categories (those successful at hearings 
and who settled privately) a higher percentage of individuals were 
economically inactive rather than seeking work. Further investigation reveals 
that the most important reason given for inactivity was sickness, followed by 
retirement. Thus for a small group of individuals, the experience is clearly one 
which has serious and long-term repercussions which may extend beyond 
employment to other areas such as health. If on the other hand the health 
problems etc. pre-date the application, then the fact that these individuals 
leave the labour market reinforces the view that the compensation in cases 
upheld at a hearing does not reflect the injustice these individuals have 
suffered. 
 
Of those who had found subsequent work (i.e. completed spells only), the 
mean time taken to obtain a new job in our sample was just over 16 weeks. 
Those who had withdrawn claims for themselves were quickest to find new 
employment, closely followed by applicants who had had cases decided in 
their favour. Again, applicants whose cases were dismissed spent the longest 
time looking for a new job. For those whose job search had not yet resulted in 
finding another job (i.e. uncompleted spells), the mean reported 
unemployment duration was 74 weeks, comfortably exceeding the threshold 
for classification as long-term unemployed. Although the number of 
                                                 
14 Note however, that this category contains only 55 survey respondents in total.  
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 unemployed in each outcome group is small, analysis of the unemployment 
duration data reveal that unsuccessful claimants at hearings and those who 
had their claims dismissed had been unemployed longest. Again therefore, for 
a proportion of appellants, the costs of bringing a claim persist beyond the 
immediate financial and stress-related costs to more long-term considerations 
in terms of unemployment and its associated problems. 
 
The final issue to be addressed in this section is to assess the relative quality 
of the current job match: whether the job was permanent or a stop-gap; the 
status of the current job relative to the old; and the pay of the current job and 
the old. Approximately 60% of the successful job-seekers who provided 
information reported that their current job was part of a long term career plan 
rather than a stop-gap. The nature of the current job again varied by case 
outcome, with claimants whose case was dismissed again faring worst and 
being most likely to have a stop-gap job. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
applicants who had been unsuccessful at a hearing were most likely to have a 
job they described as being part of their long-run career plan.  
 
In respect of pay, around 45% of claimants reported that their levels of pay 
were lower in their current job than that from which they had been displaced, 
and variation was also seen in relative pay by tribunal application outcome. 
The only group which had a larger proportion of workers who considered their 
pay to have risen in their current job rather than fallen were those claimants 
whose case had been privately settled. Successful claimants at hearings were 
next most likely to report that pay in their new job was higher compared to 
16 
 their old job, whilst claimants who had lost at their hearings were the least 
likely. There was less variation in responses to the relative status of the 
current job by application outcome, the modal response for each of the groups 
being ‘about the same’. An increase in relative status was however most 
prevalent for those who had their cases settled by ACAS and (perhaps more 
surprisingly) claimants who had their cases dismissed, while victors at 
hearings were most likely to report a decline in relative job status. 
 
The key question to be addressed in the econometric work that follows 
concerns the extent to which the post-application experience varies according 
to the characteristics of the appellant and/or the case itself. In particular, we 
seek to determine whether certain groups are particularly disadvantaged after 
bringing a grievance (e.g. females, ethnic minorities), and whether the 
outcome of the case has any bearing on post-application experience (i.e. the 
extent of labelling by potential employers) after controlling for other case, 
personal and job-related characteristics. This is clearly important in terms of 
justice – if the dismissal is ‘fair’ (as determined by the tribunal), one might 
attach a different interpretation to the results than if the dismissal is ‘unfair’. 
Similarly, ‘settlement’ may send a different signal to employers than 
withdrawing the case or having it dismissed. We go onto examine these 
issues using a range of econometric models in the next section.  
 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The econometric models that we estimate examine the above measures using 
a common set of explanatory variables split into three main types: personal 
17 
 characteristics (gender, age, marital status, ethnicity and education); the 
characteristics of the job that the claim related to (part-time, union 
membership, occupation, industry, tenure, region and workplace size) and 
case characteristics (its duration, outcome and whether it the displacement 
was for reasons of redundancy or dismissal (according to the applicant)). The 
mean for each of these characteristics is reported in Table 2. Given that the 
information presented in Table 1 indicates that the dependent variables are a 
mixture of binary, continuous (and censored) duration, and ordered 
responses, the appropriate type of model to be estimated will vary 
accordingly. In particular, the binary responses will be modelled using a 
simple probit, the duration analysis using Cox proportional hazard estimation 
and the ordered responses by ordered probit. Because of the small numbers 
of unemployed, we do not report estimates for unemployment duration. 
Neither do we report the estimates for whether or not the job the claimant 
currently has is part of their long term career plans because the explanatory 
variables tended not to be significantly different from zero, even at the 10% 
level
15. Finally, Table A1 contains selected estimates for males and female 
claimants separately, so that the main gender differences in terms of the 
impact of personal, job and case characteristics on post-tribunal outcomes 
can be identified. Such differences will be noted at appropriate points during 
the commentary on each of the regressions.   
 
                                                 
15 Interestingly, among the few variables that were significant were having a work-limiting 
disability and long tenure (both negatively signed). 
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 Table 2 reports marginal effects for each explanatory variable for the 
probability that the tribunal claimant had a job at the time of their interview and 
whether they had been employed at any time since leaving the job giving rise 
to the claim. The probability of currently having a job, or indeed having 
obtained any job since leaving the employer against whom the claim was 
brought are both strongly decreasing with age: those aged 55 and over have 
a current employment rate at least 15 percentage points lower than for other 
age categories, and workers in this age group are at least 8 percentage points 
less likely to have secured any work since the separation giving rise to the 
claim
16. Females and ethnic minorities were also less likely to have a job at 
the time of the survey, although these differences were only significant at the 
10% level. Having a limiting, long-term health problem or disability is strongly 
and negatively related to having a job both at the time of the survey or 
subsequent to the separation in question, reducing both probabilities by 
around a third compared with those with no such problems (the marginal 
effect for non-limiting health problems is similarly signed but smaller in 
magnitude and marginally significant only for the any job measure). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In addition to the lower employment probabilities for females, claimants who 
had previously been part-time had an 8 percentage point lower current 
employment rate (and a 10 point lower probability of having been employed at 
                                                 
16 18% from the oldest age category went on to retire, but individuals from this category were 
also more likely to be unemployed and not looking for work and also employed part-time. 
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 all since the separation giving rise to the claim) compared to full-timers, this 
difference being significant at the 10% level. However, few of the regional and 
industry dummies are significant (an exception with regards the latter being 
construction), while only one occupational dummy is significant 
(administrative/clerical occupations), and then only for having held any post-
separation job. Similarly, workplace size
17 appears to matter only for having 
held any job subsequent to leaving the respondent firm, with workers 
previously employed in the largest workplaces being less likely to have found 
any subsequent work. The dummy for separation as a result of redundancy 
has only a negligible effect on the probability of employment, while length of 
case is not significant at anything approaching conventional levels, although 
those who had previously submitted a case were significantly more likely to be 
in employment compared to first time applicants. 
 
Finally, as can be seen, after controlling for other characteristics, those whose 
cases were dismissed without a hearing (the reference group) were found to 
have a significantly lower probability of current employment compared with all 
other outcome groups except for those who had lost their claim at a full merits 
hearing. This effect varies in magnitude from around 10 percentage points for 
those reaching private settlements to 15 percentage points for those who 
withdrew their application. In this regard, if not in pay and status, it is ‘losing’ 
that matters rather than ‘taking part’. However, case outcome does not appear 
to impact on whether the applicant had held a job at any time since the 
                                                 
17 Ideally one would have data on firm size. Unfortunately this is only asked of the 
(unmatched) employer sample in SETA 2003. 
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 separation in relation to the ET claim since none of the other dummies is 
significantly different compared to having a case dismissed. This might 
suggest that there exist variations in the quality of subsequent matches, with 
those whose cases were dismissed perhaps forced into temporary or casual 
jobs. 
 
There are some interesting gender differences worth noting from Table A1. 
These include that married males are significantly more likely to have a job, 
whilst the opposite is true for females, although this effect only reaches the 
margins of significance at the 10% level. Females who worked part-time are 
around 17% less likely to have a job than claimants who were employed on a 
full-time basis. Taken in combination, these findings may indicate that some 
marginal female employees choose to leave the labour force or not to search 
so intensively for new jobs following dismissal or redundancy. The impact of 
the outcome of the case on the probability of getting a job is similar for males 
and females, with claimants who had their cases dismissed being less likely to 
be in employment compared to all other outcomes for both sexes. However, 
the magnitude of the case outcome effects is much larger for females, with 
those who won or withdrew their cases being significantly more likely to have 
a job at the 1% level.   
 
In Table 3, we present Cox proportional hazard estimates for the time the 
applicant takes to get a new job after leaving their previous employer. The 
estimated Kaplan-Meier survival function for both completed and uncompleted 
spells is shown in Figure 2. The Cox model is often estimated when 
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 confronted by duration data since it specifies the baseline hazard very flexibly 
because it is a non-parametric model. Given that some of the applicants find a 
new job within a week of leaving their previous job, we follow Gu and Kuhn 
(1998) and Borland et al. (2002) by setting the time taken by this group to get 
a new job equal to 1 week and increasing all other durations by 1.
18 The table 
reports coefficient estimates reflecting the hazard of finding a new job, which 
implies a negative value attached to a particular explanatory variable indicates 
a reduced likelihood of leaving the current state and hence a longer duration 
to finding a new job.  
 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
The first set of estimates in the table include only completed spells, and 
interestingly, subject to finding a job, older applicants gained employment 
more slowly than all bar the youngest age category, albeit none of these 
effects being significantly different from zero. Several of the personal 
characteristics do however exert a significant influence on the time taken to 
find a new job. For example, claimants from the ethnic communities took 
significantly longer to find a new job following leaving their previous employer, 
holding other factors constant. Married applicants found new employment 
significantly faster than those who were single, while having dependent 
children increases the duration taken to find a new job. Strikingly, a limiting 
health condition reduces the chances of finding a new job at any given time by 
                                                 
18 The Cox model only uses information on the ranking of durations and so is unaffected by 
the addition of a scalar. 
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 over 50% compared to those with no health problem, although it is unclear 
whether this reflects demand- or supply-side factors. The impact of 
occupation is also noteworthy, with claimants who previously had a 
managerial occupation generally taking longer to find a new job. That 
managers take longer to find alternative work may reflect the greater 
difficulties such workers face in searching for an appropriate alternative 
position since these may be in scarcer supply than jobs lower down the 
occupational hierarchy.  
 
Further variation is also evident by region, with applicants from the default 
region (Yorkshire and Humberside) taking significantly longer to find a job 
than applicants from the East Midlands and West Midlands. Moreover, finding 
a new job appears to be most difficult in the North of England since the only 
regions where it took longer to find a new job than in Yorkshire and 
Humberside were the North East and North West. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the length of the case has a powerful impact on the 
length of time taken to find a new job, with longer cases increasing a 
claimant’s job search. Again, there are significant differences in terms of case 
outcome: compared with the reference category of dismissed cases, 
applicants with other outcomes took statistically significant less time on 
average to find a new job.  
 
The final pair of columns in Table 3 show the corresponding results when 
including applicants with uncompleted spells. Results are generally similar to 
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 those reported above, although the magnitude of the age effects tends to 
increase. Other estimates are largely unaffected, although the family variables 
lose significance
19, with marital status only significant at the 10% level and 
dependant children becoming insignificant. The impact of some of the 
occupational dummies also weakens compared to the previous specification, 
although manufacturing workers, those with longer job tenures and who 
worked in large organisations find jobs significantly more slowly. It is also 
worth noting that the effects of ethnicity and ill-health slightly increase in 
magnitude, reflecting the adverse impact that these variables have on the 
probability of finding employment. Similarly, the influence of the outcome 
dummies tends to increase, with those having their cases dismissed taking 
significantly longer to find a new job at the 1% level or better compared to all 
of the other outcome categories. 
 
Again the impact of the outcome of the case on the time to get a new job is 
qualitatively the same for males and females, with claimants who had their 
cases dismissed taking longest to get a new job. However, none of the 
outcome dummies is significant for males, whereas three of the dummies are 
significant at the 5% level or better for females. There are also gender 
differences in terms of age since older female claimants appear to take the 
longest to find new job, with only small differences observed for males. 
Females with dependant children also appear to find employment more 
quickly than those without.  
 
                                                 
19 As do the significant regional differences noted previously. 
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 Ordered probit estimates of the respondent’s view of their relative pay/status 
in the current and previous jobs are presented in Table 4. This reveals that 
younger workers were most likely to report an increase in their relative pay, 
although none of these differences is statistically significant. However, the 
impact of age on perceived changes in status is larger, with prime age 
workers considering status of their current job to be significantly higher 
compared to the reference group of those aged 55 and over. Females are 
also significantly more likely to report that their status was lower in their 
current jobs. Although non-whites reported an increase in relative pay/status 
in comparison to whites, these differences are not significant. In contrast, 
those who have a limiting health problem or disability again fare badly: both 
pay and status are reported to be lower in their current job than the one they 
left. Claimants who previously had part-time jobs however, were more likely to 
report that their current jobs had both higher levels of pay and status. This is 
the case for both males and females, although not significant for females in 
terms of relative status.  
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
Among the remaining job characteristics, of particular note is the fact that 
workers previously employed in managerial and professional positions are 
less likely than the other occupational groups to state that their current job 
represented a rise in either pay or status compared to their previous job. This 
effect is particularly pronounced for status, with workers from each of the 
other occupational groupings except for Professionals associated with a 
25 
 significant, positive coefficient. This may reflect the existence of a steeper 
occupational ladder for managers. If ascent is the result of internal promotion, 
as one would suspect it often is, then managers lose their position on the 
ladder when they are ‘discharged’, i.e. the point of entry for new managerial 
recruits is often at a lower position, so they are likely to have to start further 
down the hierarchy.  
 
As might be expected, those with longer tenure are similarly more likely to find 
that pay and status are reduced relative to their previous position, reflecting 
the impact of acquired seniority. Both pay and status are also lower for those 
previously employed in the South East, with the effect being especially 
pronounced in respect of pay. Workers who had been made redundant are 
significantly more likely to report an increase in their pay compared to those 
who were dismissed, which echoes the findings of Arulampalam (2001) and 
confirms the importance of individual compared with collective ‘scarring’. Set 
in an efficiency wage context, this is also consistent with the notion that 
dismissal causes the employee to lose the ‘avoiding shirking worker 
premium’. In contrast, none of the case characteristics are significant in the 
pooled estimates reported in Table 4: it appears that these influence the 
probability and speed of finding a replacement job, but not the quality of the 
eventual match. Males who had their cases dismissed actually reported the 
highest relative levels of pay and status in their new jobs although this was 
only significant compared to claimants who had lost their cases in the ordered 




This paper analyses the impact of job separation on subsequent labour 
market outcomes using data on employment tribunals in the UK. We argue 
that by examining such data, we may be able to identify an additional type of 
stigma associated with the loss of a job in this context – that which is related 
to the process of making an application, and possibly taking part in, a tribunal. 
Nevertheless, our findings are generally consistent with the existing literature 
on worker displacement in that the employment consequences of job loss 
tend to be worst for older people, females, ethnic minorities and especially 
those with long-term limiting health problems/disabilities. Other interesting 
findings relate to occupation, where managerial (& professional) workers took 
longer to find new jobs and the jobs that they currently had were less likely to 
involve increased pay/status. However, we are not able to examine the long-
term impact of job loss within this particular institutional setting, which would 
be an interesting avenue for future research. 
 
In terms of case outcomes, the probability of currently being employed is 
lowest for those whose cases had been dismissed without a full merits 
hearing. Such individuals also took by far the longest of all applicants to find a 
new job. However, no significant differences were found in relation to the pay 
and status of the current job compared to the one which was lost. Also, 
applicants who had made a previous claim actually had higher rates of re-
employment than first-time claimants, suggesting that any stigma attached to 
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TABLE 1: POST-APPLICATION LABOUR MARKET STATUS BY OUTCOME OF EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL APPLICATION 







settlement  Withdrawn  Dismissed/ 
disposed of by ETS 
Current economic activity (%) 
Full-time employee  49.6  57.3  57.1  49.6  61.4  44.0 
Part-time employee  9.0  10.1  11.0  11.9  9.3  15.1 
Self-employed            
           
     
14.5 10.6 9.8 13.6 10.6
 
10.2
Unemployed 14.2 8.3 11.8 10.5 9.7 18.5
Inactive 12.7  13.7  10.3  14.4  9.1 12.2
In employment  73.1  78.0  78.0  75.1  81.3  69.2 
Any job since leaving job giving rise to claim (%)  
Yes 79.4  87.2  85.7  82.0  86.6   
     
82.9
No 20.6  12.8  14.3  18.0  13.4 17.1
Time to get a new job (weeks) 
Average   17.0  14.2  14.9  20.8  14.3  30.1 
Standard deviation  17.9  17.1  20.3  28.6  18.6  49.2 
Duration of current unemployment spell (weeks) 
Average   78.2  51.0  59.8  56.2  59.1  74.2 
Standard deviation  21.2  33.1  34.5  34.9  47.4  50.6 
Relative pay in new job (%) 
More   25.7  44.5  37.9  46.8  38.3  35.5 
About the same  16.1  12.6  17.6  12.2  17.1  12.9 
Less      58.2  42.9  44.6  41.0  44.6 51.6
Relative status of new job (%)  
Higher 27.6  21.4  33.5  28.2  28.4   
     
30.6
About the same  43.1  44.7  37.3  39.0  36.4  35.7 
Lower 29.3  33.9  29.2  32.8  35.3 33.7
Nature of new job (%) 
Stop gap  28.7  30.2  33.0  37.1  34.7  46.5 
Part of long term career plan  71.3  69.8  67.0  63.0  65.3  53.5 
Unweighted base   100  209  661  151  173  55 
Notes: Data are weighted and relate to job separations for dismissal and redundancy only. The time to get a new job statistics include those 
individuals not in employment at the time of the interview but who had found a job following making a tribunal claim.  
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TABLE 2: PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PROBABILITY OF HAVING A JOB 
 
    Currently employed  Any job post-separation 
 Mean  Marginal
effect 






Personal characteristics          
Female           
       
       
         
      
           
       
       
      
     
0.342 -0.066* 0.033 -0.028  0.025
Aged 16-24  0.113  0.160***  0.029  0.132***  0.014 
Aged 25-34  0.173  0.189***  0.026  0.118***  0.017 
Aged 35-44  0.271  0.179***  0.030  0.111***  0.020 
Aged 45-54  0.257  0.167***  0.028  0.083***  0.020 
Married 0.683 0.023  0.032 0.013  0.025
Dependent children < 16  0.359  -0.035  0.032  -0.020   0.023 
Non-white 0.095 -0.095*  0.056 -0.047    0.040
Non-limiting health problem  0.066  -0.097  0.060  -0.095*  0.050 
Limiting health problem  0.107  -0.330***  0.053  -0.293***  0.050 
Degree 0.168 0.019  0.045 -0.006  0.034
Other higher education  0.143  0.007  0.044  0.014   0.031 
A levels or equivalent  0.206  0.057  0.037  0.031   0.027 
Other qualification  0.245  -0.019  0.039  -0.002   0.028 
Previous job characteristics 
Part-time 0.138 -0.078* 0.045 -0.101** 0.041
Tenure 2-5 years  0.315  0.043  0.032  0.039   0.024 
Tenure > 5 years  0.348  -0.005  0.033  -0.039   0.027 
Professional 0.044 0.021  0.067 0.043    0.039
Associate professional  0.096  0.068  0.044  0.024   0.033 
Administrative & secretarial  0.102  0.022  0.046  0.055**  0.024 
Skilled trades  0.116  -0.016  0.050  -0.019   0.038 
Personal services  0.036  -0.076  0.086  -0.056   0.070 
Sales & customer services  0.087  0.003  0.054  0.012   0.037 
Process, plant & machinery  0.116  0.014  0.047  0.021   0.032 
Elementary 0.127 -0.005  0.048 -0.009    0.037
Manufacturing 0.221 -0.068  0.047 -0.018  0.033
Construction 0.092  0.123***  0.038 0.043  0.033 
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Wholesale / retail  0.161  0.033  0.046  0.017  0.035 
Hotels & restaurants  0.054  0.026  0.060  -0.028  0.053 
Finance 0.075 0.048  0.054 -0.013  0.045
Services & public admin.  0.250  0.037  0.042  0.026  0.029 
East Midlands  0.078  -0.031  0.073  -0.113  0.082 
East 0.066 0.005 0.073 -0.022 0.063
London 0.120 -0.082 0.074 -0.165  0.085
North East  0.060  -0.054  0.077  -0.076  0.078 
North West  0.145  0.027  0.055  -0.062  0.062 
Scotland 0.085 -0.035  0.056 -0.085  0.057
South East  0.123  -0.013  0.065  -0.041  0.064 
South West   0.079  0.001  0.065  -0.021  0.060 
Wales 0.054 -0.063 0.089 0.034  0.056
West Midlands  0.096  -0.090  0.076  -0.179  0.089 
Workplace size: 25-249  0.385  0.015  0.030  -0.027   0.024 
Workplace size: 250+  0.146  -0.048  0.044  -0.072*  0.038 
Union member  0.203  0.018  0.034  0.034   0.022 
Case characteristics 
Length of case (/1000)  137.299  0.011  0.140  0.077   0.100 
Previous case  0.059  0.090**  0.043  0.047   0.031 
Employer won  0.068  0.081  0.060  0.022   0.049 
Applicant won  0.146  0.111**  0.051  0.037   0.042 
Acas-conciliated settlement  0.497  0.130**  0.062  0.032   0.045 
Private settlement  0.115  0.096*  0.052  0.021   0.047 
Withdrawn 0.131 0.148*** 0.041 0.056    0.036
Redundancy   0.469  -0.013  0.029  0.003   0.021 
Number of observations  1052  1052  1052 
Notes: Reference categories are aged 55 & over; no qualifications; no health problem; managerial occupation; tenure 1-2 years; 
agriculture/mining/transport/communications/utilities; workplace size 1-25; Yorkshire & Humberside; case dismissed. Marginal effects are calculated 
at sample means. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level using two tailed tests. Mean length of case 
reported in days.    
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TABLE 3: COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD ESTIMATES OF TIME TO GET A NEW JOB 
 
  Completed spells only  Completed and uncompleted spells 
      Coefficient Standard  error Coefficient Standard  error
Personal characteristics      
Female       
       
       
     
       
       
-0.026 0.085  -0.076 0.080
Aged 16-24  -0.014  0.132   0.074  0.134 
Aged 25-34  0.096  0.118   0.191  0.117 
Aged 35-44   0.129  0.113   0.102  0.115 
Aged 45-54   0.036  0.111   0.083  0.106 
Married   0.244***  0.081   0.131*  0.076 
Dependent children < 16  -0.146*  0.078  -0.063  0.073 
Non-white -0.284** 0.125  -0.307** 0.119
Non-limiting health problem  -0.029  0.132  -0.057  0.137 
Limiting health problem  -0.536***  0.124  -0.546*** 
 
0.109 
Degree -0.053 0.128 -0.001 0.120
Other higher education   0.070  0.120  0.037  0.116 
A levels or equivalent   0.130  0.103   0.196*  0.102 
Other qualification  0.040  0.103  -0.004  0.102 
Previous job characteristics 
  Part-time 0.120 0.127  -0.074 0.116
Tenure 2-5 years  -0.004  0.080  0.019  0.077 
Tenure > 5 years  -0.141  0.088  -0.149*  0.084 
Professional   0.156  0.149   0.064  0.154 
Associate professional   0.289**  0.120   0.151  0.125 
Administrative & secretarial   0.092  0.122   0.173  0.114 
Skilled trades   0.227*  0.119   0.115  0.124 
Personal services   0.128  0.242  -0.067  0.241 
Sales & customer services   0.161   0.133   0.176  0.124 
Process, plant & machinery   0.309**  0.121   0.290**  0.115 
Elementary   0.115  0.123   0.039  0.114 
Manufacturing -0.140 0.116  -0.218* 0.111
Construction   0.236  0.144   0.233   0.142 
Wholesale / retail  -0.208*  0.124  -0.165  0.117  
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Hotels & restaurants  -0.217  0.172  -0.068  0.157 
Finance -0.012 0.138  -0.025 0.130
Services & public admin.  -0.211*  0.118  -0.138  0.112 
East Midlands    0.545***  0.162   0.276  0.169 
East 0.028  0.184 -0.073  0.181
London 0.123 0.145 -0.076 0.141
North East  -0.049  0.177  -0.118  0.180 
North West  -0.068  0.152  -0.093  0.145 
Scotland 0.081 0.135  -0.046 0.132
South East   0.023  0.132  -0.081  0.140 
South West    0.120  0.169   0.117  0.163 
Wales   0.233  0.178   0.136  0.185 
West Midlands   0.315*  0.166   0.072  0.164 
Workplace size: 25-249  -0.067  0.074  -0.021  0.070 
Workplace size: 250+  -0.115  0.097  -0.226**  0.099 
Union member  -0.147  0.090  -0.021  0.086 
Case characteristics 
Length of case (/1000)  -0.730**  0.325  -0.739**  0.317 
Previous case   0.126  0.148   0.047  0.142 
Employer won    0.446**  0.203    0.567***  0.190 
Applicant won    0.479**  0.191    0.603***  0.179 
Acas-conciliated settlement    0.624***  0.177    0.590***  0.166 
Private settlement    0.506**  0.201    0.543***  0.190 
Withdrawn    0.581***  0.192    0.655***  0.183 
Redundancy   -0.030  0.070  -0.057  0.066 
Number of observations  879  944 
Note: See notes to Table 2.   
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      Coefficient Standard  error Coefficient Standard  error
Personal characteristics      
Female     
     
   
       
       
-0.132 0.121  -0.261**  0.117
Aged 16-24  0.246   0.193  0.237   0.184 
Aged 25-34  0.037  0.173  0.428**  0.168 
Aged 35-44  0.240   0.162  0.399***  0.152 
Aged 45-54  0.016   0.152  0.190   0.140 
Married  0.019   0.113  -0.102   0.107 
Dependent children < 16  -0.170   0.105  -0.112   0.102 
Non-white  0.157   0.185  0.225   0.170 
Non-limiting health problem  -0.003   0.188  -0.199   0.174 
Limiting health problem  -0.433**  0.184  -0.417**  0.183 
Degree  -0.001   0.172  0.021   0.167 
Other higher education  -0.115   0.153  -0.021   0.155 
A levels or equivalent  -0.007   0.136  -0.003   0.136 
Other qualification  0.083   0.141  -0.192   0.133 
Previous job characteristics 
Part-time 0.596***  0.155  0.284**  0.141
Tenure 2-5 years  -0.146   0.110  -0.017   0.101 
Tenure > 5 years  -0.647***  0.121  -0.437***  0.114 
Professional  0.169   0.245  0.073   0.251 
Associate professional  0.375**  0.178  0.557***  0.160 
Administrative & secretarial 
   
0.385**  0.189  0.543***  0.177 
Skilled trades 0.471*** 0.165 0.391*** 0.151
Personal services  0.599**  0.273  0.816***  0.263 
Sales & customer services  0.434**  0.216  0.407**  0.197 
Process, plant & machinery 
 
0.171   0.159  0.490***  0.161 
Elementary 0.435*** 0.161 0.788*** 0.166
Manufacturing  -0.074   0.158  0.038   0.154 
Construction  0.183   0.175  -0.002   0.170  
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Wholesale / retail  0.042   0.169  0.161   0.162 
Hotels and restaurants  -0.163   0.232  0.092   0.226 
Finance  -0.327   0.217  -0.310   0.207 
Services & public admin. 
 
-0.109   0.162  -0.150   0.158 
Manufacturing -0.074 0.158 0.038 0.154
Construction 0.183 0.175 -0.002 0.170
Wholesale / retail 0.042 0.169 0.161 0.162
Hotels & restaurants 
 
-0.163  0.232  0.092  0.226 
Finance -0.327 0.217 -0.310 0.207
Services & public admin. 
   
-0.109  0.162  -0.150  0.158 
East Midlands -0.143 0.222 -0.010 0.226
East -0.279 0.247 -0.067 0.241
London -0.051 0.211 -0.193 0.202
North East -0.264 0.216 -0.075 0.220
North West -0.007 0.193 0.058 0.190
Scotland -0.143 0.175 -0.092 0.177
South East  -0.527***  0.203  -0.385*  0.200 
South West   -0.224  0.218  -0.160  0.236 
Wales 0.075 0.259 0.182 0.255
West Midlands 0.020 0.225 -0.029 0.219
Workplace size: 25-249   -0.222**  0.098  -0.173*  0.094 
Workplace size: 250+   -0.309**  0.149  -0.248*  0.146 
Union member  -0.026   0.120  -0.139   0.115 
Case characteristics 
Length of case (/1000)  0.000   0.001  0.000   0.001 
Previous case  -0.077   0.188  0.227   0.188 
Employer won  -0.384   0.309  -0.185   0.304 
Applicant won  -0.262   0.270  -0.337   0.261 
Acas-conciliated settlement  -0.173   0.241  -0.102   0.244 
Private settlement  0.056   0.277  -0.200   0.274 
Withdrawn  -0.109   0.261  -0.247   0.265 
Redundancy   0.254***  0.098  -0.020   0.091 
Number of observations  791  773 
Note: See notes to Table 2.  
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TABLE A1: SELECTED REGRESSION ESTIMATES BY GENDER 
  Male Female
  P(Job)  Time New Job  Pay   Status  P(Job)  Time New Job  Pay   Status 

















































































































































































































N              694  590 539 528 358 289 252 245
Notes: P(Job) reports marginal effects from a probit model for the probability of having a job, Time New Job the survival estimates from a regression 
for the time to get a new job for completed spells, Pay reports ordered probit estimates for the relative pay in the new job and Status the relative 
status in the new job. See Tables 2-4 for other explanatory variables included in the model and details of the reference categories. Standard errors in 












































































































































































































Source: ETS internal statistical information, 1976-1997/8; ETS Annual Reports thereafter. 
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